Glassnode Warns 1.92M BTC Quantum-Exposed as France Sets 2027 Encryption Cutoff
In today’s Bitcoin news, France’s cybersecurity agency ANSSI (Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information) announced at the France Quantum conference that it will stop certifying security systems without quantum-resistant encryption starting in 2027. A full transition deadline is set for 2030, covering government agencies and critical infrastructure operators. The announcement comes as Glassnode’s May 2026 report estimates that 6.04 million BTC—roughly 30.2% of total supply—has publicly visible keys on-chain.
The policy shift is more than a regulatory update. It marks one of the clearest government timelines yet for moving away from classical cryptographic standards, arriving as researchers increasingly assess Bitcoin’s potential exposure to future quantum computing breakthroughs.
Glassnode Breakdown: Where the 6.04 Million BTC Risk Sits
Glassnode divides the exposed Bitcoin supply into two main buckets. The first is 1.92 million BTC (about 9.6%), classified as structurally exposed. These coins include outputs where public keys are inherently revealed, such as early-era P2PK transactions, legacy multisig formats, and Taproot (P2TR) outputs.
The second category, 4.12 million BTC (around 20.6%), is labeled operationally exposed. This includes coins that became vulnerable due to address reuse, partial spending patterns, or custodial wallet practices that exposed public keys.
Importantly, Glassnode highlights that the greatest risk comes from current usage patterns rather than ancient dormant coins. Centralized exchanges account for an estimated 1.63–1.66 million BTC of the operational exposure pool. By contrast, sovereign holdings from the U.S., U.K., and El Salvador are reported to show no quantum exposure, as they avoid exposed key types. The remaining 13.99 million BTC (about 69.8%) is considered unexposed under Glassnode’s framework.
The theoretical risk centers on Bitcoin’s ECDSA signature scheme using the secp256k1 elliptic curve. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could derive private keys from exposed public keys, putting already-visible funds at risk once “Q-Day” arrives. Outputs using hashed public keys (like P2PKH) remain safer until spent, offering delayed exposure.
France’s Post-Quantum Migration Plan
At the France Quantum conference, ANSSI’s Samih Souissi emphasized that the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) extends beyond technical standards into governance, industrial planning, and sovereignty.
The roadmap requires organizations to inventory sensitive systems by end-2026, map affected infrastructure by end-2027, and complete migration to PQC by 2030.
This aligns with broader global timelines. Google has targeted 2029 for internal PQC migration, while quantum security firm Project Eleven estimates a cryptographically relevant quantum computer could emerge around 2030.
Meanwhile, NIST has indicated plans to phase out classical public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC by roughly 2030–2035, with major tech firms already adapting hardware and software roadmaps accordingly.
Academic research presented at DEF CON 33 suggests that as few as 1,754 logical qubits could theoretically threaten secp256k1 under optimistic assumptions, though most experts still expect real-world risk to remain 10–20 years away.
Earlier estimates vary widely. Deloitte has suggested up to 4 million BTC could be exposed under broader definitions, while Chaincode Labs placed the range between 4 million and 10 million BTC. Glassnode’s 6.04 million figure falls within this spectrum but uses stricter classification rules.
